Counterintuitive response to tax incentives? Mortgage interest deductions and the demand for debt by Sommervoll, Dag Einar
Discussion Papers No. 492, January 2007 
Statistics Norway, Research Department 
Dag Einar Sommervoll 
Counterintuitive response to tax 
incentives? 
Mortgage interest deductions and 
the demand for debt 
Abstract: 
A number of European countries changed their tax system in the early 1990s  along the lines of the 
US tax reform act of 1986. After the reforms marginal tax rates were generally lower, and mortgage 
interest deductions less generous. At the same time a long period of house appreciation started in 
most countries. This paper considers this puzzle empirically using a rich data base of Norwegian tax 
records from 1986 to 2000.  We use nonparametric, difference in difference and tobit approaches in 
attempt to control for a wide array of factors that may offset, or mask, response to changed 
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probability of debt across age groups, and a strikingly linear and unchanged relationship between 
debt and gross income for young households. After the reform house prices doubled and tripled. The 
wealth effect may spur consumption. We find no sign of consumption smoothing by using self-owned 
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1. Introduction 
The US tax reform act (TRA) of 1986 has served as a model for tax reforms world wide. Though the 
reforms varied across countries, tax payers in general faced lower marginal taxes and weaker 
incentives for acquiring debt after the reform. This was expected to have an adverse effect on housing 
markets. Looking back at the first decade of the post reform era, house prices have soared in most 
OECD-countries. Clearly, the effect of a tax reform can be offset by other factors in the economy. We 
ask what other factors are likely to affect households in a strong and direct way masking tax reform 
response? Moreover, does heterogeneity in the tax record data allow us to get at least some crude 
estimates of the isolated effects of the tax reform? We attempt to answer both questions affirmatively.  
 
The 1986 tax reform may be viewed as one of the largest natural experiments concerning households 
responses to changes in taxation. Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) illuminate the difficulties in 
evaluating real responses, in opposition to financial, accounting and timing responses. The case of 
mortgage debt is an illustrative example,  the TRAs asymmetric treatment of consumer and mortgage 
debt, which after the reform gave a swift shift to mortgage debt (Maki, 2001). In other words, 
households’ tenure decision was most probably affected in two ways: First by changing the relative 
price between owner occupied and rented housing, and second by creating a loop hole for accounting 
other debt as mortgage debt.  
 
Mortgage demand is intimately linked to a household’s tenure decision. Tax distortions may occur if 
rental income is more heavily taxed than self-owned housing consumption (Henderson and 
Ioannides,1983). A house, an asset on the housing market, is sticky since transaction costs are 
considerable. Furthermore, indivisibility (in most cases) makes a house investment sluggish, and 
responses to tax incentives slow, since observed household portfolios may reflect adjustment to prior 
tax regimes. Shares, bonds and deposits, however, are highly liquid and households may respond 
quickly to changed tax incentives regarding these assets. Scholz (1990) studied the impact of the TRA 
on household portfolios, and found that high income households did hold disproportionately many tax 
favored shares.  
 
A household’s tenure decision is for most households linked to the possibility of mortgage financing. 
Brueckner (1994) analyzes the households mortgage size decision in a two-period framework. He 
gives explicit conditions for when credit constraints are binding, in other words, when a household 
seek the highest possible mortgage. Potential credit constraints may seriously affect households’ 
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portfolio choices in two ways. First by direct favoring the housing market, since a house or dwelling 
also offers a solution to the housing consumption need, and as such a tax favored one, both prior to 
and after the reform. The second way is more important from a portfolio point of view: A house serve 
as a debt collateral. Credit institutions tend to be reluctant to supply credit for investment in asset 
markets, and view dwellings as more secure collaterals for debt. Phrased differently, a household 
actively seeking risk diversification by investing in various markets, may find credit financing hard 
with the exception of mortgage financing. An alternative is to achieve diversification over time; first 
enter the housing market, and second over time use the house as debt collateral to finance other 
investments.  
 
If true, that is if credit constraints are present, then observed household behavior is not a result of 
changed tax incentives alone. This is our point of departure. A household’s demand for debt is the 
result of considerations largely concealed to us. The credit supply side on the other hand is more 
transparent. In fact, credit institutions tend to rely on credit score models, which contrary to household 
decision rules, are both formalized and routinely applied. Credit score models are discussed in Section 
2. Their structure offers insight, when and to whom constraints are likely to be binding. In this respect 
our approach ties in with contributions of Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) and Ortalo-Magné and Rady 
(1999) by putting an emphasis on the role of credit supply. 
 
Section 3 gives a brief description of the Norwegian tax reform and macroeconomic factors in the time 
period from 1986 to 2000 that may have influenced household behavior. In particular, after tax 
mortgage costs and house prices have varied considerably both prior to and after the reform of 1992. 
Most likely, this affected intertemporal debt considerations as present capital costs and expected future 
rewards changed over time. 
 
In Section 4 we consider cross sectional tax data gathered every year from 1986 to 2000. By using 
nonparametric techniques, we discover several intriguing regularities. One serious problem with 
reforms in general, is the dynamic nature of adaptation. This is particularly true for housing market 
investments, due to considerable transaction costs. Moreover, an adjustment on the margin in response 
to a tax reform may prove difficult. Young households may be argued to face a tenure and mortgage 
decision less tainted by past debt history. However, we find a striking static regularity between real 
debt and real gross income over time for this cohort. Likewise, equally puzzling, the ratio of 
households with debt as a function of age is virtually unchanged by the reform. 
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These observations may be taken as an indication of a weak response to changes in tax incentives. 
This is in agreement with the findings of Jappelli and Pistaferri (2006) concerning the Italian tax 
reform, which  coincided in time with the Norwegian tax reform, and cancelled the link between 
marginal tax and mortgage deductions. They conclude that borrowing constraints and lack of financial 
information are the two plausible explanations for their findings.  
 
In the case of Norway we find empirical regularities consistent with both credit constraints as well as 
response to changed tax incentives. Older households with gross income above a certain level reduced 
debt, whereas older low income households increased debt.  If credit constraints are most likely to be 
binding for low income households, increased debt after the reform is consistent with changes in credit 
constraints implied by credit score models. High income households, on the other hand, may have 
been less constrained both prior to and after the reform, and thus are in the position to react adequately 
to weakened incentives.  
 
A shortcoming of the reasoning above, is that the intertemporal nature of housing investments only 
enter through the house as a mortgage collateral. Most likely, there is heterogeneity across households 
regarding present-cost/future-gains considerations. In other words mortgage demand, and not only 
supply can be conditional on housing return forecasts. If true, borrowing behavior will reflect this. 
 
In the last two sections we attempt to estimate the effect of changes in debt interest deductions, though 
only the mixed effect of changes in demand and supply is observed. The key insight is the following. 
Observed debt for constrained households will reflect credit constraints, whereas for largely 
unconstrained households observed debt will reflect sensitivity to after tax cost of debt.  In Section 5 
we present a two-period credit demand model based on a model of Dunsky and Follain (1997). Our 
version of the Dunsky-Follain-model may be viewed as an analogue of the credit score model for 
credit institutions, in the sense that debt is conditional on future gains, as well as immediate costs.  
 
In Section 6 we estimate a tobit regression model for debt demand. The analysis supports the 
hypothesis of procyclic credit demand. Furthermore, unconstrained households responded to less 
generous interest deductions by reducing debt. 
 
A tax reform may be viewed as a natural experiment. In Section 7 we apply a difference-in-difference 
approach. We find a substantial response to the tax reform. However, the result is largely driven by 
increase in real debt for the control group, which may be at least partly attributed to weakened 
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constraints.  The final section gives a brief discussion of the combined findings of the different 
approaches. 
2. Mortgage supply 
In this section we will briefly describe the mortgage supply side. A household’s demand for debt is a 
result of potentially complex intertemporal considerations. Unobserved idiosyncratic factors as well as 
time and consumption preferences can be argued to make the intertemporal decision problem opaque 
to the analyst. The supply side is more transparent, since granting a mortgage relies on a risk analysis 
which is ideally objective in the sense that the mortgage decision relies on company rules. In practice 
these rules tend to be formulated as a credit score model. 
 
A credit score model can be represented by two equations. The first is investment evaluation as the 
house serves as a mortgage collateral. The present value (following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)) limits 
the mortgage size. By assuming adaptive expectation a two-period market evaluation may give rise to 
the following constraint:  
 
(1)  Present value constraint (PVC):  ( )1ehM P h r E≤ + + , 
 
where M is the mortgage, Phe is the expected value of one unit of housing the next period, h is the 
number of housing units, r is the money marked interest rate and E is the households net equity. 
 
The PVC-constraint is a risk neutral constraint, since it relies on the present value of expected future 
return only, and not on its (expected) variance. The second constraint is linked to cash flow: 
 
(2)  Cash flow constraint (CFC):  M a I≤ , 
 
where M is the mortgage, I is gross income and a is a positive number.  
 
This condition relates the mortgage size to the gross income of the household, and is routinely posted 
on credit institutions in the form of a mortgage calculator for potential borrowers.1  
 
                                                     
1
 Several web based  calculators and costumer aids exist, see for example   http://www.dnbnor.no (webpage of Norway’s 
largest bank with a mortgage market share of 40 percent), or http://www.min-okonomi.no/Laan/laanekalkulator. 
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A possible explanation for this rule of thumb is the following. Credit institutions realize that forecasts 
may prove wrong. Furthermore, they assume that house owners will hesitate to sell if the transaction 
price does not meet their mortgage obligations. In other words, credit institutions rely on the house 
owner’s incentive to avoid personal bankruptcy. A manageable mortgage-to-income ratio increases the 
probability of weathering the storm in times of depreciation.  
 
Additional market and agent characteristics may play a role in the credit supply decision. Equations 
(1) and (2) may then be viewed as expected mortgage constraints or approximations to real life 
constraints. The main insight relevant from evaluation of response to tax reforms is that (1) and (2) 
pinpoint when and to whom credit rationing is likely to occur. Moreover, (1) is procyclic and may at 
times dominate (2); (2) on the other hand may be a binding constraint for low income households 
irrespective of housing market movements.   
3. Norwegian tax reform of 1992, mortgage interest rates and the 
housing market 
Norway experienced a bank crisis2 in the late 1980s and a sharp market decline in the housing market. 
The tax reform passed the Norwegian Parliament April 1991 and was put in to effect in 1992. The 
reform coincided with the end of a long period of considerable inflation. One year after the reform 
housing markets started to recover and mortgage interest rates were gradually lower as figures 3.1 and 
3.2 illustrate.   
 
                                                     
2
 Credit markets had prior to the early 1980s been subject to regulations. After the deregulation a period of credit growth 
started. In the late 1980s the real interest rate was record high, and many failed to meet their debt obligations. This lead to 
bankruptcy of several of Norway’s largest banks, as well as a substantial fall in house prices.  
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Figure 3.1. Norwegian house price index, 1985-2000 
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Source: Statistics Norway. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Mortgage interest rate and inflation rate 
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Source: Statistics Norway. 
 
 
The Norwegian tax reform of 1992 removed the coupling between marginal tax and mortgage interest 
deductions. Prior to the reform mortgage interest were fully deductible from gross income, giving a 
tax subsidy of up to 70 percent for some households. After the reform mortgage interest remained 
fully deductible, but with a flat 28 percent irrespective of marginal tax bracket.3  
 
                                                     
3
 Further details concerning the Norwegian tax reform can be found in Fjærli (2004) (Section 2. The previous Tax System 
and the Key Elements of the 1992 Tax reform, page 437) 
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Figure 3.3 displays the after tax nominal mortgage cost rate prior and after the 1992 reform. One 
striking feature is the bump in present costs for high marginal tax (high income) households in the 
early 90s, and the slow movement back towards prereform driven by lowering of mortgage interest 
rates. Low income households on the other hand, have faced a steady reduction of present after tax 
mortgage cost from a staggering above 12 percent in the late 1980s to below 4.5 percent in 1996. The 
reduction of after tax cost is largely driven by lower interest rates, but not solely. Low income 
households have low marginal tax and 20 percent of households had a marginal tax lower than 28 
percent (Figure 3.4). For these households the reform represented higher interest deductions. Figure 
3.3 and Figure 3.4 show a striking heterogeneity with respect to after tax mortgage cost prior to the 
reform, and generally lower (for most households) after tax mortgage cost in the aftermath of the 
reform.  
 
Figure 3.3 After tax mortgage interest for high and low marginal tax groups.  
High marginal tax = 60 percent. Low marginal tax = 24 percent. After tax mortgage 
intereste rate =(1- τmt) rnt, where τmt is the mortgage interest deduction rate and rnt is the 
nominal mortgage interest rate in percent.   
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Source: Statistics Norway. 
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Figure 3.4. Marginal tax distribution prior to reform 
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Source: Survey of income and wealth, Statistics Norway 
4. Norwegian Tax records; signs of credit rationing 
4.1 Data description 
The data source is the Survey of Income and Wealth (Statistics Norway), which is based on individual 
tax returns.  The data contain information about debt, income, demographic variables for each year 
from 1986 to 2000.  The data set includes over 100 000 observations. We restrict the analysis to non-
retired and non-self-employed. The reason for excluding the latter is a potential mix between business 
related and personal debt. Furthermore, the debt exposure of retired persons may reflect intertemporal 
considerations exclusive to that group, transfers to heirs, or adaptation specific to that cohort like war 
pensions and sailor pensions. Excluding these two group leaves a sample of 63 302 observations. 
Mortgage incentives are linked to the marginal tax rate before the reform, and for each household this 
tax rate is imputed as the marginal tax rate given no deductions.  
4.2 Signs of credit rationing 
Households’ response to a tax reform is in its nature dynamic. Housing investments tend to be sticky, 
unforeseen changes in after tax costs of self-owned housing consumption and investment is not 
expected to have an immediate effect on household portfolios. It may deter further exposure in 
housing markets or it may stimulate a faster rate of payments on the principal. Such effects may take 
years to unfold, and as behavior tend to be conditional on macro economic as well as demographic 
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factors a cautious analysis of cross sectional data is required. In the following we use nonparametric 
methodology to present summary statistics that shed some light on potential credit constraints and 
responses to changed tax incentives. 
 
From a dynamic point of view we would expect young households to serve as markers for the impact 
of the reform in the short run, since paying back mortgage takes time, whereas deciding upon a new 
mortgage allows an instantaneous reaction to changes in tax incentives. Figure 4.1 displays real debt 
as a function of real gross income5 for the home owner cohort of people of age6 between 20 and 30.  
The two curves show a strikingly linear relationship between gross income and debt. Furthermore, this 
relationship is virtually unchanged by the reform expect for a divergence for high income households, 
which increases debt to gross income ratio in the aftermath of the reform. Figure 4.2 highlights another 
static relationship: The fraction of households with debt as a function of age is virtually unchanged. 
 
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.3 are consistent with credit rationing driven by Eq. (2) of the credit score 
model. However, this also implies that the income to mortgage factor, a, is unchanged. It may be 
argued that going from a high inflation scenario to a low inflation scenario, is likely to change the 
gross income to mortgage ratio, since nominal interest payments become lower. If income to mortgage 
ratios stayed fixed and this was a result of rationing, it means that in the post reform years credit 
institutions did not respond to the new low inflation scenario, and handed out credit conservatively. 
On the other hand, both prior to and after the reform, there were times of appreciation as well as 
depreciation. This may mask the importance of Eq. (1) of the credit score model in times of 
depreciation. 
 
The same kind of comparison for the cohort 40 to 60 years old tells a different story. Figure 4.3 relates 
debt and gross income prior to and after the reform. The post-reform curve is tilted down in 
comparison with the pre-reform curve, indicating that low income households increased their debt and 
high income reduced their debt. This tilt is consistent with rationing implied credit score models; low 
income households experience a binding constraint that is weakened as the house market turned, hence 
increase debt, whereas high income households adjust to lessened tax incentives. However, as Figure 
3.3 displays, low income households faced falling after tax mortgage costs, though deductions were 
lower in contrast to high income households to whom falling nominal interest rates, has been partly 
                                                     
 
5
 Real gross income is defined to be nominal gross income deflated with the consumer price index. (Consumer price index =1 
in 1986) 
6
 Household age defined to be the age of the family member with highest gross income. 
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offset by less generous tax deductions. Our nonparametric analysis does not allow us to capture the 
isolated effect of the changed after tax cost of debt. We will attempt to do this by using regression 
techniques in Section 6. 
 
Households in the 40-60 cohort have high house ownership percentages (above 80 percent) for the 
period in question. This implies that the lion’s share of households are house owners both prior to and 
after the reform. For these households reduction of debt is likely to be increased payments on the 
principal. Another mechanism is  up trading.  In times of appreciation, which dominated the post 
reform years, starter homes tend to appreciate more (Røed Larsen and Sommervoll (2004)), which 
means that climbing up the housing ladder may require less mortgage financing, absolutely and 
relative to households purchasing starter homes.  
 
Figure 4.4 is consistent with this line of reasoning: The young borrow more as a reaction to less severe 
constraints or to increased investment eager. Older households, on the other hand, reduce debt. For 
ages above 28 years there is a surprisingly regular shift towards lower debt.  
 
Figure 4.1  Real debt versus real gross income. Age cohort 20 to 30. Number of observations: 
9 496. Debt and gross income given in Norwegian 1986-kroner. Tricube smoothing. 
Bandwidth 0.4  
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Source: Survey of income and wealth, Statistics Norway. 
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Figure 4.2  Fraction of households with debt as a function of household age. Number of 
observations: 63 302. Debt given in Norwegian 1986-kroner. Tricube smooting. 
Bandwidth 0.4  
 
.
7
.
75
.
8
.
85
.
9
.
95
O
w
n
e
rs
hi
p 
fra
ct
io
n
20 30 40 50 60
Household age
before after
 
Source: Survey of income and wealth, Statistics Norway. 
 
Figure 4.3  Real debt versus real gross income. Age cohort 40 to 60. Number of observations: 
29 703. Debt given in Norwegian 1986-kroner. Tricube smoothing. Bandwidth 0.4  
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Source: Survey of income and wealth, Statistics Norway. 
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Figure 4.4  Real debt versus household age upper 4 deciles of the gross income distribution. 
Number of observations: 24 892. Debt and gross income given in Norwegian 1986-
kroner. Tricube smoothing. Bandwidth 0.4  
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Source: Survey of income and wealth, Statistics Norway. 
5. Mortgage Demand 
Mortgage demand is intimately linked to tenure choice. Though both rental and self owned housing 
are solutions to the basic need of shelter, they constitute two distinct bundles of services. The tenure 
choice is not merely a consideration of after tax user costs. We do not attempt to model the tenure 
choice decision, but assume that a household has decided upon self owned housing consumption, and 
need to determine the mortgage size. Our point of the departure is the model of Dunsky and Follain 
(1987). A household attempts to maximize expected utility in a two-period setting. That is, households 
maximize: 
 
(3)  ( )2( ) ( , ) ( ), ( )E U U c h F E W Wσ= + ,  
where E(U) is the expected utility, U(c,h) is the first period utility function of housing consumption h, 
and other consumption c, and F is a function of  the first two moments of the second period wealth W. 
 
The maximation is subject to the following constraint: 
 
(4)  0 c h eW I P c P h M B+ = + − + , 
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where W0 is wealth in the first period, I is income, Pc (Ph)  is the price of consumer goods (unit price 
of self owned housing7), M is the mortgage and Be is risky financial asset. 
 
The expected wealth E(W) is given by: 
 
(5) 
( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) 1
1 1 1 ,
p p h
m e e I y e e m m p h
E W E r P h
r M E r B E r I I E r B r P h
τ δ
τ τ τ
= + − −
− + + + + + − + + +
 
 
where E(rp) is the expected appreciation rate of housing, τp the property tax rate, δ the depreciation rate 
of housing, Ph the unit price of housing, h units of housing, rm the mortgage interest rate, E(re) the 
expected rate of risky asset return, Be the risky assets, E(rI) the expected salary increase rate, I the 
income, τy the marginal income tax rate, and τm the mortgage deduction tax rate. 
 
The Dunsky-Follain model makes an explicit link between future rewards and debt demand. 
Household expectations may be formed in many ways. We assume adaptive expectations8 of the 
following nature: Agents observe a variable Xt and its one period (yearly change) 1t t tX X X −∆ = −  and 
extrapolate to the next period by 1
e
t t tX X X+ = + ∆ . With these assumptions (5) can be rewritten as 
 
(6) 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) 1
1 1 1 .
pt pt p h
m et et e It It y et et e m m p h
E W r r P h
r M r r B r r I I r r B r M P h
τ δ
τ τ τ
= + + ∆ − −
− + + + + ∆ + + + ∆ − + + ∆ + +
 
 
This model captures one essential part of (housing) investment, the intertemporal weighing of present 
cost versus future gain. Present after tax cost of consumption and investment is: 
                                                     
7
 Phh is the purchase price, and not an imputed price of self-owned housing consumption.  
8
 After the seminal paper by Muth (1960), adaptive expectations have been widely used in macroeconomic inflation models 
(Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999), and several extensions to the optimality of adaptive expectations under various 
assumptions of the underlying data generation process have been proven (Satchell and Timmermann, 1995). Adaptive 
expectations are susceptible to the Lucas Critique, and may be far from optimal when negative serial correlation is likely. 
However, adaptive expectations and positive serial correlation can be linked as adaptive expectation may spur positive serial 
correlation, and a tendency of persistent price patterns may rarely punish adaptive rules of action. In the case of housing 
markets, empirical work (Case and Schiller, 1989) indicates price movement persistence, possibly in violation of a market 
efficiency hypothesis. Cho (1996) surveys the literature on housing market efficiency, and concludes that markets tend not to 
be informationally efficient. Furthermore, both house prices and excess returns exhibit short run serial correlation. However, 
if central banks are worried about asset inflation and target house prices negative serial correlation can be the result. 
Furthermore, lags in housing supply can also challenge the near-rationality assumption of adaptive expectations, if increased 
supply is not met by increased demand.  
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(7)  Present after tax costs: ( )1c m m hP c r P hτ+ − .  
The model is not directly applicable empirically. The investment horizon may be unknown at the time 
of purchase. In fact, the agents may view the endogeneity of reselling time as a way to avoid selling at 
an unfortunate time. Households may wrongly assess the probability of self-determined selling time, 
but their conjectures about future behavior, wrong or not, will affect their present demand for debt. 
 
One way to address the problem of a blurry investment horizon is to interpret the two periods as 
“present” and “future”. Present after tax cost are given by (100- τmt) rnt , where  τmt and rnt is mortgage 
interest deduction rate and mortgage interest rate, respectively, at time t. Expected future returns for a 
given household are problematic empirically. A household may have a definite investment horizon, or 
at least a vague feeling of likely time for moving to another dwelling. Fortunately, there is some 
empiric evidence for a correlation between present price patterns observed by households and their 
present conjectures of housing market appreciation (Case and Shiller, 1989 and Shiller, 1990) 
irrespective of investment horizon. If true, then the adaptive expectation framework of the two-period 
model above may serve as an approximation for self-perceived future housing returns. 
 
Present-future considerations are likely to vary with age. This calls for a model specification which is 
flexible across age groups. One empiric regression set up that meets these requirements is the 
following: 
(8)  ( )100j k k mtj ntj k kj ht j j j jD a r E P Xβ τ θ ς η ε = + Σ − + + ∆ + Σ +  ,  
where k ranges over age cohorts, Dj  is inflation adjusted debt for household j, α is a constant term, 
(100- τmtj) rntj is inflation adjusted capital cost in time period t for household j, Ekj is a dummy equal to 
1 if household j belongs to age group k and zero otherwise, Pht is housing price index change, and Xj 
is household specific dummies, see Table 6.1 for details.  
 
A few comments are in order. This model is a stylized way to represent a present cost and future 
reward with respect to mortgage based housing investment. The model is partial in the sense that 
expected house appreciation represents future investment return10 in general.  
                                                     
 
10
 Including the change in Norwegian Stock market index on the right hand side is an option. However, there is no credit 
market serving non-self-employed households with credit for asset market speculation. So a potential link between debt and 
asset markets is dubious or at least indirect by using a housing market portfolio as a debt collateral. Including the share in the 
stock market index and running a regression show no positive relation between debt and stock appreciation. 
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6. Regression Analysis 
The first column (Reg.1) of Table 6.1 displays the coefficient estimates of the regression model (8) of 
the preceding section used on the full sample. The after tax current cost impact coefficient (ATCCI) 
estimate is negative for all age cohorts. The second column (Reg. 2 of Table 6.2) gives estimates of 
the model excluding the lowest decile of the gross income distribution and the 20-30 age cohort, 
which can be argued to be most affected by credit constraints.  
 
The estimates on these two samples display the same kind of regularities, expected negative sign of 
the ATCCI-coefficients as well as strikingly regular relation between debt and household size. The 
house appreciation coefficient is estimated with expected sign and high t-value. Though expected 
signs and high t-values are encouraging, our model is susceptible to the critique that applies to all 
parametric econometrics; omitted variables and the choice of functional form may seriously bias the 
estimates. Likewise, significance of the macro variable, housing appreciation, does not imply 
causality. The relevance of the expected sign and t-value is conditional on the premise that households 
follow housing market movements when deciding upon debt. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 2, 
credit institutions may rely on the same forecasts; hence both debt demand and credit constraints move 
in the same direction. Interestingly in this respect, is to note that the expected house appreciation 
coefficient is estimated to be higher (52.4 versus 40.7) in Reg. 1 than in Reg. 2, which may be read as 
a stronger link to the credit bounds when not excluding households most likely to be constrained. At 
the same time the impact of the tax parameter (ATCCI) goes down and fail to be significantly different 
from zero for the 30-40 cohort.11 
 
The estimates may understate the long term adjustment to reduced interest deductions, as  households 
need time to adjust. Furthermore, cross sectional data only contain the indirect trace of tenure change 
and debt reconsiderations. One way to capture some of the dynamics is to exclude some time interval 
just after the reform. Estimation excluding the first two years after the reform gives after tax cost 
coefficients estimates that are considerably higher (Table 6.1, Reg. 3). This may be taken as sign of 
gradual adaptation to the post reform era. However, excluding one post year after another does not 
give a steady progression towards higher long term effect. This may be due to a weakness in the 
model, that already was present in the Dunsky-Follain model: In a two-period framework, a household 
invest in the first period and sell in the second and last. Persistent house appreciation has a 
                                                     
11
 The estimates are robust in the sense that resampling and reestimation does not change the sign nor significance of the 
estimates.  Rerunning the model using debt to income ratios as dependent variable gives qualitatively the same picture with 
respect to sign and significance of the after tax cost variable. 
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considerable wealth effect on home owners. Using the house as debt collateral, facilitates consumption 
smoothing. The age cohorts 50 to 60 and 60 and above may be argued to have strong incentives for 
consumption smoothing either by trading down or increasing debt. Intriguingly, as Figure 4.5 clearly 
shows, the shift in real debt as a function of age gives no indication whatsoever, that this is the case.  
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Table 6.1 Regression results 
 Reg. 1a Reg. 2b Reg. 3c 
 Real debt Real debt Real debt 
Age cohort 20-30 -73.863   
 (5.31)**   
Age cohort 30-40 20.225 19.318 11.72 
 (-1.69) (-1.33) (-0.72) 
Age cohort 50-60 -87.67 -112.774 -112.468 
 (6.13)** (6.69)** (5.94)** 
Age cohort 60- -238.944 -277.688 -287.313 
 (12.28)** (11.77)** (11.06)** 
After tax current mortgage cost impact  
Age cohort 20-30 
(ATCCI) -3.318   
 (2.13)*   
ATCCI, age cohort 30-40 -4.057 0.327 -0.798 
 (3.23)** (-0.2) (-0.44) 
ATCCI, age cohort 40-50 -8.237 -5.687 -8.274 
 (6.53)** (3.73)** (4.75)** 
ATCCI, age cohort  50-60 -7.59 -3.678 -6.382 
 (4.42)** (-1.78) (2.70)** 
ATCCI, age cohort 60- -6.521 -2.232 -3.077 
 (2.62)** (-0.72) (-0.88) 
Expected house appreciatione 52.429 40.725 51.572 
 (4.24)** (2.64)** (3.23)** 
Single  -139.662 -100.181 -102.611 
 (35.07)** (15.36)** (15.17)** 
Couple with one childf 80.96 62.56 61.037 
 (18.89)** (11.67)** (10.91)** 
Couple with two children 93.27 65.757 65.918 
 (24.92)** (14.48)** (13.95)** 
Couple with three children 115.383 88.934 89.261 
 (24.95)** (16.55)** (15.93)** 
Couple with four children 131.012 114.441 113.704 
 (16.58)** (12.86)** (12.16)** 
Constant 356.835 368.479 382.741 
 (37.48)** (32.13)** (30.76)** 
No. of observations 63 302 46 318 42 619 
a
 Full sample of non-self-employed and non-retired. b Excluding the lowest decile of the gross income 
distribution and the age cohort 20-30. c In addition to the ex-clusions of Reg. 2, the observations from 
the two first years after the reform is dropped. d Age cohort 40-50 is the reference for age cohort 
dummies e Represented by observed change in housing price index. f Couple without children is the 
reference for household composition dummies t-values are given in parentheses. One and two stars 
indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 5% and the 1% level, respectively.  
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7. Difference in difference approach 
A tax reform may be viewed as a natural experiment, and as such be argued well suited for a 
difference in difference approach. In this section we adopt the same approach as used in Jappeli and 
Pistaferri (2006). Let the control group be defined by households that had marginal tax rate between 
27 and 29 percent. These households had roughly the same mortgage deduction rate both prior to and 
after the tax reform. We define the treatment group to be households with marginal tax higher than 34 
percent.12 A marginal tax rate of 27 percent is low by Scandinavian standards; thus a treatment group 
of households that faced more lenient tax deductions after the reform cannot readily be constructed.  
 
Denote Dijt the amount of debt for household j in group i (i=0, control group; i=1, treatment group) at 
time t (t=0, before reform; t=1 after reform). We assume that demand for debt is: 
 
(9)  { }1 1, 1ijt t j ijtD f j tβ δ υ= + + × = = + . 
 
For j in {0,1}, t in {0,1}, and where 1{.} is an Boolean function that equals 1 if the statement in the 
bracket is true and zero otherwise. We assume that υijt is an i.i.d. error term. Both groups are subject to 
an aggregate shock βt and fj captures long term differences between the groups. We can identify the 
effect of the reform using the following difference-in-difference of expectation values: 
 
(10)  ( ) ( )1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0j j j jE D D E D D− − − . 
 
The difference-in-difference estimate is given in Table 7.1. We see that the treatment group does not 
significantly change debt, whereas the control group nearly double real debt. The validity of a 
difference-in-difference approach relies on three assumptions: (1) The reform is exogenous with 
respect to debt; (2) It is exogenous with respect to sample composition; (3) No other events affect the 
groups asymmetrically. 
 
Endogeneity of the reform (1) may be argued highly unlikely. Assumption (2) may be harder to 
justify, since movements across tax brackets need not be independent of borrowing decisions. The 
Achilles heel of this approach is (3). As the control group has low marginal taxes (by Scandinavian 
                                                     
12
 We leave out households with marginal tax between 29 and 34 percent, to separate the control group from the treatment 
group. Including these households in the treatment group gives result qualitatively equal, but  (as expected) give a difference-
in-difference estimate with lower absolute value.  
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standards), they are likely to be susceptible to credit constraints. Furthermore, constraints vary with 
the housing market, since houses serve as mortgage collaterals. This implies that the profound change 
of the control group towards higher debt may be driven by weakened constraints; constraints that can 
be argued less severe for the treatment group. As discussed in the previous section, housing market 
turns influences both on the debt demand and supply, thus house appreciation may have boosted credit 
demand.  
 
Table 7.1  Difference in difference estimates for real debt. Control group: Marginal tax rate 
prior to deductions equal to 0.27-0.29.Treatment group: Marginal tax rate prior to 
deductions equal to 0.34 
 
Treatment group Control group 
Between-group 
difference 
After the reform 2.72 3.31 -0.59 
 (0.11) (0.01) (0.11) 
 
   
Before the reform 3.33 1.81 1.52 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
 
   
Within group difference -0.61 1.50  
 (0.11) (0.05)  
 
   
 
 
Difference in 
difference  
 
 -2.11  
 
 (0.12)  
 
8. Conclusion 
The Norwegian government implemented a tax reform which ultimate effect was to eliminate the link 
between the marginal tax rate and mortgage deductions. After the reform the deduction rate was at 28 
percent for all households. This implied less generous deductions for most households and was 
expected to have an adverse effect on mortgage demand.  
 
We find evidence of such an effect, but our analysis reveals a much more complex empirical picture. 
In particular, the effect of the tax reform may have been offset by three different factors: 
 
A. The tax reform coincided with a shift from high to low inflation (Figure 3.2). This reduced the 
nominal after tax cost of mortgage for most households. As noted by Schwab (1982) reduced 
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inflation tilts the stream of real payments towards the future; thus making the present burden of 
mortgage financing lower. 
 
B. Credit constraints may have been binding for some households at some points in time. If true, 
they may mask household adaptation to the tax reform. 
 
C. Mortgage demand is likely to be linked to conjectures of future housing returns, and as these 
may vary over time, so will expected after tax returns on investment. 
 
These factors leave different empiric imprints. Credit constraints, as implied by credit score models 
are likely to be binding for young and low income households. Both the nonparametric analysis of 
Section 4 and the regression analysis of Section 6, may be interpreted as smoking guns for presence of 
rationing. From a tax reform point of view, the tax records of these households offer little insight to 
adaptation to the tax reform of 1992.  Largely unconstrained households, on the other hand, may 
respond to changes in incentives. The analysis of Section 4 shows that older and high income 
households did reduce real debt. To what extent this reduction was distorted by (A) and (C) is a 
difficult empiric question. Our regression analysis incorporating both present after tax costs and future 
returns approximated by recent changes in the house price index, seems to indicate sensitivity to 
present after tax costs as well as future returns. Though we single out a wide set of variables affecting 
mortgage, and perform various sensitivity tests, the results may be challenged. In addition to a non-
canonical choice of functional form, potential endogeneity and omitted variable problems may weaken 
the analysis. Furthermore, portfolio adjustments in the aftermath of a tax change may take years to 
unfold, and an analysis may at best underestimate the long term adaptation to the tax reform. Despite 
these weaknesses the regression may be argued to capture some regularity in tax records, and 
combined with the nonparametric analysis in Section 3 it offers insight to household behavior. 
 
Older and high income households did reduce real debt, in contrast to young and low income 
households. This paves the way of another puzzle. With house prices on a steady rise, households 
already owning a house, which is true for most older households, got wealthier.  Increased wealth may 
spur consumption, if households have preferences for consumption smoothing. However, we find no 
trace of increased borrowing using the house as a debt collateral. On the contrary, both the parametric 
and nonparametric analysis shows exactly the opposite. This can be viewed as a surprising variant of 
present biased preferences, a keen eye on present after tax debt costs, and a blind spot for the present 
wealth. If true, households may be overly sensitive to changes in present after tax cost of housing 
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investment. This is in contrast to the findings of Jappelli and Pistaferri (2006). They did not find 
evidence for a link between tax considerations and the demand for debt in the case of the Italian tax 
reform. They question whether lack of financial information about after tax interest rates plays a vital 
role in the Italian case. Norway may be more informationally efficient, though there are no surveys to 
reject or strengthen such a hypothesis.13 
 
The difference-in-difference estimate may also be interpreted as support for an adequate response to 
changed incentives. However, households in the control group all face low marginal tax rates (by 
Scandinavian standards), which may imply that they are susceptible to credit constraints. Their near 
doubling in mean debt may at least partly be a response to less severe credit rationing. If true, the 
difference-in-difference estimate may overstate the effect of the tax reform. 
 
In sum, our three approaches give a strong indication of debt reduction for unconstrained households. 
This may be viewed as encouraging from a policy point of view, since the success of a reform tends to 
rely on informed households taking adequate actions. Why doubled and tripled house prices did not 
spur consumption smoothing remains a puzzle, and may be hard to reconcile with the type of 
preferences over time which we normally assume. This may imply that there is a considerable inertia 
in household adaptations, at least when it comes to wealth changes.  
 
 
                                                     
13
 A weak support for informational efficiency regarding after tax costs, is persistent coverage of interest rates and after tax 
mortgage cost of housing in mass media.  A weaker form of efficiency may be sufficient: Those who faced the stiffest after 
tax cost increase knew it, and reacted accordingly. As income correlates with education and economic literacy, this may have 
been the case. 
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